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Abstract—Optical fiber networks consist of fibers that are laid
out along physical terrestrial paths. As such, they are vulnerable
to geographical physical failures, such as earthquakes and Elec-
tromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attacks. Moreover, such disasters can
lead to multiple, geographically correlated, failures on the fiber
network. Thus, the geographical layout of the fiber infrastructure
has a critical impact on the robustness of the network in the face
of such geographical physical failures.
In this paper, we develop tools to analyze network connectivity
after a ‘random’ geographic disaster. The random location of the
disaster allows us to model situations where the physical failures
are not targeted attacks. In particular, we consider disasters that
take the form of a ‘randomly’ located disk in a plane. Using
results from geometric probability, we are able to approximate
some network performance metrics to such a disaster in polyno-
mial time. We present some numerical results that make clear
geographically correlated failures are fundamentally different
from independent failures and then discuss network design in
the context of random disk-cuts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Optical fiber networks consist of fibers that are laid out
along physical terrestrial paths. As such, they are vulnerable
to geographical physical failures, such as earthquakes, bombs,
and Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attacks [16], [29], [32].
Moreover, such disasters can lead to multiple, geographi-
cally correlated, failures on the fiber network. Thus, the
geographical layout of the fiber infrastructure has a critical
impact on the robustness of the network in the face of such
geographical physical failures. In this paper, we attempt to
evaluate the impact of geographically correlated failures on
network connectivity with respect to a random disk. We first
develop the necessary tools to evaluate network performance
metrics under a geographic failure model. This, in turn, allows
us to study network designs that can lessen the effects of
regional disasters.
Previous works have considered the problem of finding the
worst-case location for a geographic failure (represented as a
disk or line segment) in a geographic network with respect
to certain network connectivity measures [1], [2], [27]. This
models the scenario where the network is attacked with the
intention to reduce its capacity or connectivity. On the other
hand, in this paper we consider the impact of a randomly
located disaster on network connectivity. The random location
of the disaster can model failure resulting from a natural
disaster such as a hurricane or collateral (non-targeted) damage
in an EMP attack. In [25] we studied this problem with
respect to a randomly located line-failure; in this work we
focus on a randomly located disk-failure. Similarly, in [33]
the survivability of undersea cables with respect to a randomly
located disk is studied, however only a two node topology was
considered.
Wide-spread failures have been studied extensively in the
context of logical topology [8], [9], [14], [19]. Most of these
papers model the topology of the Internet as a random graph
[5] and use percolation theory to study the effects of random
link failures. Based on various measurements (e.g., [13]), it
has been recently shown that the topology of the Internet is
influenced by geographical factors such as population density
[4], [17], [34]. Yet, these works do not consider the effect
of failures that are geographically correlated. Network surviv-
ability has also been studied extensively (e.g., [6], [15], [20],
[35]), but most of the previous work in the study of physical
topology and fiber networks (e.g., [23], [24]) focus on a small
number of fiber failures. In contrast, here we focus on events
that induce a large number of failures in a certain geographical
region (e.g., [3], [7], [16], [29]). Only recently has the impact
of geographically correlated failures started to receive attention
(e.g. [31], [27], [1]).
In this paper we model a random disaster by a disk of
a particular radius that is ‘randomly’ located on the plane.
Any links (modeled as line segments) that are intersected by
this disk are removed from the network. In Sections II and
III we introduce geometric probability and present a method
that allows us to approximate joint link failure probabilities
under a random disk-cut. To the best of our knowledge [25],
[33], and this paper are the first to apply geometric probability
techniques to network survivability. In Section IV we use these
tools to show how to approximate certain metrics under this
geographic failure model. In Section V we present some nu-
merical results that make clear that geographically correlated
failures are fundamentally different from independent failures
and then in Section VI we present some network design
problems in the context of random-disk cuts. We conclude
and discuss future research directions in Section VII.
Our ultimate goal is to understand the effect of regional
failures on the connectivity and reliability of a network, and
to expose the design tradeoffs related to network survivability
under a regional disaster. These tradeoffs may imply that there
is a need to protect electronic components in certain regions
(e.g., shielding against EMP attacks [16], [29]) or there may
be a need to redesign parts of the network in order to make it
less vulnerable to regional failures.
II. MODELING RANDOM CIRCULAR CUTS
In this section we describe how to model random disasters
using geometric probability. For simplicity, we focus only on
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Fig. 1. Every disk in the plane of radius rb can be parameterized by the location of
its center. Denote the center of disk D as [xD, yD].
disasters which remove links intersecting a random disk. After
introducing some basic definitions from geometric probability,
we review classical results which allow us to find single link
failure probabilities. These results are requisite for Section III
where we show how to find joint link failure probabilities to
random disk-cuts.
A. Geometric Probability
Geometric probability is the study of probabilities involved
in geometric problems. In our case, we are interested in the
probability that a ‘randomly’ placed disk (of a particular
radius) in the plane will only intersect a certain set of links
(e.g., links whose removal would disconnect the network). We
model a disaster event in the network as a single randomly
located disk of a radius rb.
Before proceeding further, we will present some useful
notation. Denote the perimeter of a set of points in the plane
C by LC and its area by RC . Given a set in the plane, let
〈·〉 denote the set of all disks in the plane of radius rb that
intersect it.
Geometric probability tells us how to assign a measure to
sets of disks; let this measure be denoted by µ. The rest of this
section reviews results from geometric probability (see [21],
[30]) that are necessary for the development of this work.
Note that every disk in the plane of radius rb can be
parameterized by the location of its center. Denote the center
of disk D as [xD, yD] (see Fig. 1). Let DO be the disk of
radius rb centered at the origin.
We now present the definition of the measure µ.
Definition 1 (Measure of a set of disks). The measure µ of a
set of disks G is defined as the integral
µ(G) =
∫
G
dxdy
Note we use G to denote both a set of disks and the set
of centers of these disks. This integral is the area of G in the
(x, y) plane and will be denoted by area(G). This definition
appeals to intuition; in the same way the ‘size’ of a set of
points in the plane is its area, the ‘size’ of a set of disks is
the area of the disks centers.
Definition 2 (Minkowski Sum). The Minkowski sum of two
sets in the plane A and B in Euclidean space, denoted by
rbQ
Fig. 2. The dotted shape above represents Q ⊕ DO . This shape is known as a
hippodrome and it represents the set of all points whose shortest distance to Q is less
than or equal to rb [12]. Denote the hippodrome corresponding to a link Q and radius rb
by H(Q, rb). Note that a disk D of radius rb intersects Q iff [xD, yD ] ∈ H(Q, rb).
A⊕ B, is given by
A⊕B = {a+ b|a ∈ A, b ∈ B}
Intuitively, every point in the Minkowski sum C ⊕ DO
represents a center of a disk of radius rb that intersects C.
We will now discuss an important example. Let Q be a line
segment link; consider Q ⊕ DO (see Fig. 2). This shape is
known as a hippodrome and it represents the set of all points
whose distance to Q is less than or equal to rb [12]. Denote
the hippodrome corresponding to a link Q and radius rb by
H(Q, rb). Note that a disk D of radius rb intersects Q iff
[xD, yD] ∈ H(Q, rb).
Lemma 1 ( [30]). Let C be a bounded closed convex set of
points in the plane, then
µ(〈C〉) =
∫
〈C〉
dxdy = area(C ⊕DO) = RC +LCrb + pirb
2
Intuitively, every point in the Minkowski sum C ⊕ DO
represents a center of a unique disk of radius rb that intersects
C. Integrating over the set of centers of these disks yields
the measure of 〈C〉. For example, consider a line segment
link Q of length d. Now the measure of the set of disks of
radius rb that intersect Q is µ(〈Q〉) = area(Q ⊕ DO) =
area(H(Q, rb)) = 2drb + pirb
2
B. Single Link Failures
Let 〈Q〉 and 〈C〉 be sets of disks of radius rb in the plane
such that 〈Q〉 ⊂ 〈C〉. Given µ, the probability that a ‘random’
disk is in the set 〈Q〉 given it is in the set 〈C〉 is given
by the ratio µ(〈Q〉)
µ(〈C〉) [30]. Note that C contains the centers
of all possible disk failures and is required for normalization
purposes.
We now present an example relating to network survivabil-
ity. Consider a rectangle C with height a and width b and a
line segment Q of length d inside C (see Fig. 3). Now we
consider a random disk-cut. We have:
Pr(Q cut|C cut) =
µ(〈Q〉)
µ(〈C〉)
=
area(Q⊕DO)
area(C ⊕DO)
=
2drb + pirb
2
ab+ 2(a+ b)rb + pirb2
(1)
III. GEOGRAPHICALLY CORRELATED LINK FAILURES
In this section we present an algorithm that calculates the
measure of disks of radius rb intersecting only a particular set
of links. This result will allow us to calculate the probability
that a random disk-cut intersects a certain set of links in
replacements C
Q
rb
rba
b
d
Fig. 3. The rectangle C and line segment link Q are shown in solid. The center
of every disaster that intersects Q is given by the dotted hippodrome H(Q, rb). The
center of every disaster that intersects C is given by C ⊕DO which is shown as the
larger dotted shape.
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Fig. 4. The measure of disks that intersect C , l3, and l4 but neither l1 or l2 is
given by the area of the shaded region above (for ease of presentation we do not picture
C). This measure can be written as µ(〈C〉 ∩ 〈l3〉 ∩ 〈l4〉 − 〈l1〉 ∪ 〈l2〉) as well as
area((C ⊕DO) ∩H(l3, rb) ∩H(l4, rb)−H(l1, rb) ∪H(l2, rb)).
a network (e.g. links whose removal would disconnect the
network). We will then use this to efficiently calculate network
performance measures with respect to random disk-cuts.
Let L be the set of all line segment links in the network and
C be a convex polygon that contains L. Consider some set of
links K ⊂ L. We wish to find the measure of all disks of radius
rb that intersect C and every link in K but intersect no links
in L−K . See Fig. 4 for an example. This measure is given by
µ
(
〈C〉 ∩ (∩k∈K〈k〉)− ∪q∈(L−K)〈q〉
)
. It is clear that a disk
D belongs to this measured set iff i) [xD, yD] ∈ C ⊕ DO,
ii) [xD, yD] ∈ H(k, rb) ∀k ∈ K , and iii) [xD, yD] 6∈
H(q, rb) ∀q ∈ (L−K). So, this measure can also be written as
area
(
(C ⊕DO) ∩ (∩k∈KH(k, rb))− ∪q∈(L−K)H(q, rb)
)
.
For ease of presentation we abuse notation and denote this
measure by area(K).
Definition 3 ( area(K) ). Let area(K) be given by the measure
of all disks of radius rb that intersect C and every link in K
but intersect no links in L−K .
A. Approximation
We note that finding area(K) seems difficult because
it requires finding the area of intersections and unions of
hippodromes. In the following we describe a method for
approximating area(K) which is based on approximating
hippodromes by polygons for which there are known methods
to calculate intersections, unions, and area. We approximate
H(l, rb) by the inscribing polygon Hˆn(l, rb) such that H(l, rb)
shares the line segment portion of its boundary with Hˆn(l, rb)
rb
l
dl
Fig. 5. We approximate H(l, rb), shown as a dashed hippodrome above, by the
inscribing polygon Hˆn(l, rb) such that H(l, rb) shares the line segment portion of its
boundary with Hˆn(l, rb) and each end of Hˆn(l, rb) forms half of a regular 2n-sided
polygon. The solid polygon above is Hˆ4(l, rb).
and each end of Hˆn(l, rb) forms half of a regular 2n-sided
polygon (see Fig. 5). Let ârean(K) be defined the same
as area(K) except that every hippodrome is replaced by
its polygon approximation. Using techniques for finding the
intersection, union, and area of polygons [28], we can find
ârean(K) in polynomial time.
We now present a lemma that shows ârean(K) is a good
approximation for area(K) for large enough n. A proof is
omitted due to space constraints and can be found in [26].
Lemma 2. limn→∞ ârean(K) = area(K) ∀ K ⊂ L
IV. EVALUATING NETWORK RELIABILITY METRICS
In this section we introduce and show how to evaluate some
performance metrics with respect to a random disk-cut.
A. Network Model and Metrics
We start by describing our network model. Let N be the
set of nodes in our geographical graph where each node is
represented by a point on the plane. A link between two
nodes is represented by a line segment with endpoints at the
respective node locations. Let L be the set of all links in the
network; we assume every link has a capacity associated with
it. Let C denote the convex polygon containing the network
(C is required in order to assign probabilities to random disk
events). If a ‘random’ disk that intersects C also intersects
some links, those links are disrupted. Our goal is to evaluate
the performance metrics described below after a single random
disk-cut that intersects C.
We now introduce two important network performance
metrics which are evaluated after the removal of the intersected
links. We will use tools from geometric probability to evaluate
‘average’ values of these metrics with respect to a random
disk-cut. The first metric we consider is the total capacity of
intersected links. Let this metric be denoted by TC. The other
metric we consider is the fraction of node pairs that remain
connected to each other. Let this metric be denoted by A2TR.
B. Evaluation of the Metrics
We now show how to evaluate the metrics above with
respect to a random-disk cut or radius rb. The basic idea is that
the center of all disks of radius rb that intersect a particular
set of links (and no other links) is some set in the plane. By
showing the number of these sets we need to consider grows
polynomially in N and by evaluating the area of each set, we
can evaluate a ‘weighted average’ of a metric over all possible
cuts.
Fig. 6. This figure shows the hippodromes and related intersections with respect to
NSFNET [22] and a circular cut of rb = 2.
Let P be the set of all subsets of L that can be intersected by
exactly one disk of radius rb. Evaluating performance metrics
to a random disk-cut is a weighted average over every K ∈ P .
Let Y (K) be a reliability metric evaluated after the removal of
every link in K . Since area(K)
area(C⊕DO)
is the probability a random
disk of radius rb that intersects C also intersects every link
in K and no links in (L − K), the performance metric to a
random disk-cut can be expressed as:
∑
K∈P
area(K)
area(C ⊕DO)
Y (K) (2)
Section III shows how to approximate area(K) in poly-
nomial time. Y (K) for the performance metrics can also be
calculated in polynomial time. In the following, we apply the
theory of arrangements to show that the size of P grows
polynomially with respect to N . For technical reasons this
theory cannot be directly applied to this setting and requires
modification.
Let ∂ denote the boundary of a set. Consider the set of
curves R = ∂C ∪ {∂H(l, rb)|l ∈ L}. These curves partition
C, the set containing the network, into maximally connected
regions called faces that are bounded by the curves in R. By
enumerating these faces, we can enumerate every element in
P (since every disk in a particular face intersects the same
links). Arrangements, a computational geometry tool, allow us
to enumerate the faces of a set of curves in R2 in polynomial
time. However, the theory requires that every pair of curves
intersect in a finite number of locations [11] which does not
hold in our setting. Nonetheless, the theory can be applied
with a minor perturbation to the geometry.
Since enumerating P , evaluating Y (K), and approximating
area(K) all take polynomial time, the network performance
metrics can be approximated in polynomial time under a
random disk failure.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we evaluate some network metrics using
the results of the previous section. We consider NSFNET as
found in 1991 [22] and the ARCOS-1 ring network [10]. The
NSFNET network we consider has 14 nodes and connects
major universities across the U.S. (see Fig. 6). ARCOS-1 has
24 nodes and connects regions on the Dominican Republic,
Florida, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela (see Fig. 7). All
distance units mentioned in this section are in longitude and
Fig. 7. ARCOS-1 network circa 2009 [10].
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Fig. 8. The solid line shows A2TR versus the probability a unit (latitude/longitude)
of fiber is cut by a random disk of rb = 2. The dashed line shows A2TR assuming
links fail independently such that links fail with the same probability as in the random
disk-cut case.
latitude coordinates (one unit is approximately 60 miles) and
for simplicity we assume latitude and longitude coordinates
are projected directly to [x, y] pairs on the plane. We assume
that all the link capacities are equal to 1. We also assume each
network is contained within a rectangular set C.
A. Independent Versus Correlated Failures
Using the results of Section IV, we calculate A2TR of
NSFNET and ARCOS-1 to random-disk cuts of rb = 2 while
the size of C varies. The size of C is varied to change the
probability a unit of fiber is cut. So we can plot A2TR versus
the probability a unit of fiber is cut. See Fig. 8 for results.
Note the linear form of the result in the figure; this agrees
with Equation 2 since 1/area(C ⊕D) is proportional to the
probability a unit of fiber is cut.
Next, we calculate A2TR of the networks assuming in-
dependent link failures such that links fail with the same
probability as in the random disk-cut case. Thus the probability
a link fails is still a function of its length, however links
fail independently. Since the total number of links is small in
each network, calculating A2TR by enumerating all possible
failures is still feasible (possible failures are exponential in
number of links). Note the total expected number of removed
links is the same for both the independent and geographically
failure models. See Fig. 8 for results.
Notice that in NSFNET A2TR under independent failures
is greater than in the case of random disk-cuts. Perhaps
this is because in most cases at least three links must fail
independently to disconnect the network; however a disk that
intersects a node is guaranteed to disconnect the network.
Since most backbone networks are likely to be well connected,
we expect a random disk-cut to lead to lower A2TR than
independent link failures in this type of mesh network setting.
We also note that similar results were found for the random
line-cut setting [25].
Looking at the results for the ARCOS-1 network we see
the opposite tendency; A2TR under independent failures is
typically less than the case of random disk-cuts. Perhaps this
is because a single disk that intersects ARCOS-1 usually only
removes two adjacent links creating components of size 1 and
|N | − 1 (where |N | is the number of nodes) whereas just two
independent link failures on opposite sides of the ring create
components of size |N |/2 and |N |/2 (which results in lower
A2TR).
B. Multiple Failures
We calculate the TC metric of the NSFNET and ARCOS-1
networks under sequential disk failures, both intentional and
random. We assume every additional random failure is located
independently of the previous failures. We first describe how
to evaluate metrics after sequential failures, then we present
some numerical results.
To calculate a network metric after two randomly located
sequential disk failures, we simply evaluate the weighted
average of the metric over each pair of possible areas
(each area represents the set of centers of disks that re-
move exactly the same links). Equation 2 then becomes∑
K′∈P
∑
K∈P
area(K′) area(K)
area(C⊕DO)2
Y (K ∪ K ′). For n failures,
Equation 2 becomes
∑
K1∈P
· · ·
∑
Kn∈P
(
n∏
i=1
area(Ki)
area(C ⊕DO)
)
Y (
n⋃
i=1
Ki).
In [27] we propose an algorithm to evaluate network relia-
bility metrics after an intentional disk failure. To calculate a
network metric after sequential intentional failures, we simply
apply the algorithm in [27] iteratively.
Fig. 9 shows the results for multiple failures, both inten-
tional and random for NSFNET (similar results for ARCOS-1
are not shown). As expected, the plots are sub-linear since
each additional failure is being placed on a smaller network.
Note that random failures result in much less disruption than
intentional failures.
VI. NETWORK DESIGN UNDER RANDOM CIRCULAR CUTS
In this section we discuss some network design problems in
the context of random disk-cuts. In all the proposed problems
the location of every node is fixed; the problem is to find a set
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Fig. 9. The solid line shows the total expected capacity removed versus the number of
randomly located circular disasters of rb = 2. Using the algorithm in [27], the dashed
line shows the total capacity removed versus the number of intentionally located circular
disasters of rb = 2.
of links most robust to some metric under some constraints.
In the following, let N be a set of nodes fixed on the plane
and assume all links are represented as line segments between
the nodes.
(i) A reasonable goal is to design a connected network
with the least expected number of links cut by a random
disk of radius rb. By Eqn. 1 and linearity of expectation, the
expected number of links cut is proportional to pir2b (|N |−1)+
2rb
∑
l∈U dl where U is the set of links chosen and dl is the
length of link l. So, this problem reduces to minimizing the
total length of links in the network while ensuring the graph is
connected. This is equivalent to finding a Euclidean minimum
spanning tree of N which can be done in polynomial time.
Note however that the resulting network is not robust because
a single link failure will disconnect it. We also note this is
the same result we get for optimizing for random line-cuts
[25]. If fact, it can be shown that this result will hold for any
convex-shaped cut.
(ii) We next consider ring networks. A reasonable goal is
to design a connected ring network with the least expected
number of links cut by a random disk of radius rb. As before,
the expected number of links cut is affine in the total length
of the links. So this problem reduces to finding the minimum
length Hamiltonian cycle. This is equivalent to the Euclidean
traveling salesman problem which is hard to compute [18]. We
again note this is the same result we get for optimizing for
random line-cuts [25]. If fact, it can be shown that this result
will hold for any convex-shaped cut.
(iii) The final problem considers how to connect two nodes
such that the path between them is robust to a random-disk
disaster of radius rb. Let S and T be a pair of nodes in
N and let U be a set of links. The problem is to find a
ST path consisting of links from U that has the minimum
probability of being cut. This may correspond to finding
the most robust path between two cities along preexisting
conduits. Since a disk intersects a path iff it intersects a
hippodrome corresponding to a link in a path, we want to
find a ST path whose edges belonge to U and whose area
of the union of corresponding hippodromes is minimized. The
authors do not know a polynomial time algorithm to solve the
above problem except in a trivialized setting.
12
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
−
ǫ 1
−
ǫ
S T
Fig. 10. The bottom path is shorter than the top path by 2ǫ. However the top path is
more robust to a random circular failure as compared to the bottom path since the blue
dotted shape has less area than the red dashed shape. This shows the shortest path is not
necessarily the most robust to failure.
An interesting example is given in Fig. 10. The uppermost
path here gives the most robust path to a random disk failure;
however, the bottom path is the shortest. This shows the
shortest path is not necessarily the most robust to failure.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We focused on randomly located circular cuts on a network
which can model the ‘random’ nature of a natural disaster or
collateral damage. Using tools from geometric probability we
demonstrated how to compute failure probabilities and showed
how to approximate some network performance metrics in
polynomial time under this failure model. We then presented
some numerical results that make clear geographically cor-
related failures are fundamentally different from independent
failures and then discussed some network design problems.
Some future research directions include the consideration of
convex cuts (e.g., oval cuts) and robust network design in the
face of geographical failures.
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